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 ‘Wish You Weren’t Here…’  
New Models of Social Solidarity in the European Union 
 
 
MICHAEL DOUGAN & ELEANOR SPAVENTA* 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION:  
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A MULTI-LEVEL WELFARE SYSTEM 
 
It is trite to observe that, even though responsibility for welfare provision remains 
primarily in the hands of the Member States, Community law nevertheless has a 
significant impact upon the domestic systems of social protection. Indeed, we have 
grown used to the idea that the European Union now constitutes a multi-level welfare 
system characterised by a complex combination of local, national and Community 
policies. This is sometimes expressed in the notion that the Member States are now 
‘semi-sovereign welfare states’ whose choices about how to provide for the social 
well-being of their own citizens are increasingly constrained not only by obvious 
factors such as the demographic pressures posed by an aging population and the need 
to compete within the globalising economy but also by the pervasive influence of the 
Union – which has not, however, evolved into a ‘newly sovereign welfare state’ 
 292 
determining for itself the conditions under which we pay taxes and receive benefits.
1
 
As a result, the idea of social solidarity can no longer be treated simply as a national 
or local monopoly. It also has a vital Community component.
2
  
When analysing this Community component, it is perhaps inevitable that the 
Union lacks either any clear organising concept of social solidarity for itself, or any 
coherent approach to those national concepts of welfare provision with which it must 
interface.
3
 Instead, social solidarity trickles through different Treaty provisions in 
different forms and in different ways – creating a veritable kaleidoscope of welfare 
rights and principles.  
Within this kaleidoscope, it is tempting to focus on the Community’s 
contribution to multi-level social solidarity in negative terms, that is, how far the core 
Treaty provisions on economic policy threaten national choices about social 
protection. For example, domestic structures for the delivery of welfare benefits and 
                                                 
* University of Liverpool and University of Birmingham (respectively). We are very grateful to 
participants at the Cambridge Social Welfare conference (June 2003) for their helpful comments. 
1
 In particular: S Leibfried and P Pierson, ‘Social Policy: Left to Courts and Markets?’ in H Wallace 
and W Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP, 2000). 
2
 And, of course, an important international component: consider, eg the European Convention on 
Social and Medical Assistance (11 December 1953), the European Social Charter (18 October 1961) 
and the Revised European Social Charter (3 May 1996). On the Council of Europe’s international 
instruments concerning social protection, and their potential (indirect) relevance within an EU legal 
context (thanks to Art 34 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000 C364/1), see 
further: J Tooze, ‘Social Security and Social Assistance’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic 
and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart Publishing, 
2003). 
3
 In this regard, the new Constitutional Treaty, for all its references to solidarity, seems unlikely of 
itself to herald any greater coherence. 
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services may be found to act as barriers to the effective operation of the Internal 
Market (under the provisions concerning the free movement of goods or services, and 
also the rules on competition law or state aids) and thus require objective justification 
under the appropriate public interest derogations.
4
 National welfare choices are also 
put under more indirect types of pressure by the process of European economic 
integration. For example, free movement might act as an invitation for undertakings to 
engage in social dumping, inspired by differences in the contributions and general 
taxation intended to fund national social security systems, in turn tempting the 
Member States to engage in a destructive cycle of regulatory competition which will 
eventually undermine high standards of welfare protection.
5
 Moreover, there are 
concerns that the Growth and Stability Pact intended to consolidate the final stage of 
monetary union may have a negative impact upon the financing and planning of the 
domestic social protection systems, when Member States prefer cutting back on 
welfare expenditure (rather than increasing taxes) as a means of meeting the excessive 
budget deficit threshold of 3% GDP.
6
  
                                                 
4
 Consider, in particular, the effect of Art 49 EC on health care provision: eg Case C-158/96 Kohll v 
Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbreakel and others v 
Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-157/99 B S M Garaets-Smits 
v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-
5473; Case C-385/99 Müller Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, 
and van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappi ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case 
C-56/01 Patricia Inizan v Caisse primaire d'assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003].ECR I-0000  
5
 Eg L Delsen, N van Gestel and J van Vugt, ‘European Integration: Current Problems and Future 
Scenarios’ in J van Vugt and J Peet (eds), Social Security and Solidarity in the European Union 
(Physica-Verlag, 2000). 
6
 See the contribution of Mica Panic in this collection.  
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Against that background, the Union has often been accused of suffering from a 
form of ‘constitutional asymmetry’: the legal tools employed in pursuit of economic 
efficiency far outweigh those available in the cause of social justice – and have the 
potential to ride roughshod over the complex bargains struck by domestic actors in the 
exercise of their residual welfare competences.
7
 However, the kaleidoscope is much 
more nuanced than this analysis would suggest. In fact, Community law also makes a 
significant positive contribution to social provision within the European Union. 
Indeed, one can identify the emergence of new and peculiarly supranational models of 
solidarity which support and supplement (rather than threaten or undermine) the 
domestic welfare states. This chapter will focus upon one aspect of this dynamic 
contribution: the rights to free movement and equal treatment enjoyed by Union 
citizens who visit another Member State on a temporary basis. In particular, we will 
investigate how far such individuals should be entitled to claim access to welfare 
benefits provided by the host society on the same terms as own nationals or other 
lawful residents – and what sort of legal framework is emerging from the Court of 
Justice and the Community legislature to address this controversial issue.  
Many commentators champion the evolution of a ‘European social 
citizenship’, whereby the process of ‘ever closer union’ encourages novel 
expectations of social solidarity based upon the shared identity of Union citizenship. 
In the absence of extensive redistributive or harmonising competences in the sphere of 
welfare provision, the most effective mechanism by which the Community might 
realise such ambitions is by employing the principle of equal treatment to guarantee 
that migrant Union citizens are assimilated into the social protection systems of their 
                                                 
7
 Eg B Schulte, ‘The Welfare State and European Integration’ (1999) 1 EJSS 7; F Scharpf, ‘The 
European Social Model: Coping With the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 40 JCMS 645. 
 295 
host societies. However, this process of assimilation directly challenges the traditional 
link between an individual’s legitimate right to claim welfare support and her / his 
recognised membership of the Member State’s own solidaristic community – thereby 
raising questions about how far the common bond of Union citizenship can really act 
as a substitute for accepted ties of belonging based upon nationality or economic 
contribution. While the Court has already defined the basic parameters of this 
challenge as regards resident but economically inactive migrant Union citizens, the 
legal situation seems more uncertain when it comes to Union citizens who are merely 
visiting another Member State on a temporary basis. We identify two main models 
which could provide the basis for future developments.  
The first (and more orthodox) is an ‘objective justification approach’: all 
migrant Union citizens are entitled to claim equal treatment as regards all benefits 
falling within the material scope of the Treaty – thus forcing the host society in every 
case to defend restrictions on access to its social protection system, especially 
residency requirements, by reference to a valid public interest requirement and the 
principle of proportionality. The second (and more novel) is a ‘comparability 
approach’: temporary visitors should be entitled to equal treatment as regards benefits 
falling within the material scope of the Treaty only once it has been verified that they 
are in a comparable situation to own nationals and other lawful residents. In 
particular, when it comes to social benefits which represent an expression of solidarity 
by the domestic welfare community towards its own members, temporary visitors 
might well be found to be in a non-comparable situation; if that is the case any 
difference in treatment – including that arising from the application of a residency 
requirement – would not give rise to discrimination which the host state needs to 
justify. We will argue that the comparability approach has several significant 
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advantages over the objective justification model. Moreover, the relevance of this 
comparability approach is not diminished even after the adoption in spring 2004 of 
Directive 2004/38 on free movement for Union citizens, which purports to address – 
but in our view, only incompletely – the relationship between temporary visitors and 
the host state’s social assistance benefits.8  
 
II. SOCIAL SOLIDARITY: COMMUNITY AND MEMBERSHIP 
 
Social solidarity, at least as it is understood in Europe, represents an assumption of 
welfare responsibilities between the members of a particular community. Solidarity 
systems are based, in particular, upon a principle of subsidisation: a proportion of the 
wealth generated or enjoyed by certain members of a group is placed at the disposal 
of public institutions in order to satisfy the social needs of other members of the 
group.
9
  
Solidarity and community are in fact closely related concepts, and this is true 
for two main reasons. The first is primarily moral in nature. Social protection 
measures promote the redistribution of society’s wealth, contrary to the outcomes 
                                                 
8
 Dir 2004/38 on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/77. 
9
 Consider, in particular, AG Fennelly in Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395, para 29: social 
solidarity ‘envisages the inherently uncommercial act of involuntary subsidisation of one social group 
by another’. Similarly, eg A Winterstein, ‘Nailing the Jellyfish: Social Security and Competition Law’ 
[1999] ECLR 324; T Hervey, ‘Social Solidarity: A Buttress Against Internal Market Law?’ in J Shaw 
(ed), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, 2000); S O’Leary, 
‘Solidarity and Citizenship Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 2003 (forthcoming). 
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which would result from the free operation of market forces. Such redistributory 
policies, especially those offering non-contributory benefits and services paid for out 
of general taxation, are perceived as being ‘morally demanding’ (or perhaps 
‘compelling’). They are thus dependent upon a diffuse sense of social solidarity, 
which is nevertheless sufficiently powerful to persuade people to engage in the 
necessary process of subsidisation, of the sort which only derives from the existence 
of a common identity, forged through shared social and cultural experiences, and 
institutional and political bonds.
10
 The second reason is largely financial in character. 
The redistribution of wealth, particularly through the provision of non-contributory 
welfare benefits and services, also requires a realistic management of society’s 
available resources. The competent public authorities must strike a balance between 
the number of people potentially able to claim social support, and the number of 
people actually able to pay for it. After all, if demand for welfare benefits were to 
outstrip the revenues capable of supporting them, the financial balance of the 
solidarity system could be seriously jeopardised.
11
   
This marriage between solidarity and community, compelled by the need to 
construct a moral argument capable of justifying subsidisation, and by the budgetary 
realities of matching welfare demand and supply, has begotten an important 
conceptual progeny of its own. It becomes necessary to identify precise parameters of 
membership – defining which individuals belong to the collectivity (and are thus 
                                                 
10
 In particular, T Faist, ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’ (2001) 39 
Journal of Common Market Studies 37. Also, eg G Majone, ‘The European Community Between 
Social Policy and Social Regulation’ (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 153. 
11
 See further, on the conceptual foundations of social solidarity, K Tinga and E Verbraak, ‘Solidarity: 
An Indispensable Concept in Social Security’ in J van Vugt and J Peet (eds), Social Security and 
Solidarity in the European Union (Physica-Verlag, 2000). 
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entitled to stake claims to its welfare support), and which individuals are excluded 
from the collectivity (and therefore unable to make out a legitimate case for social 
protection). In other words, ‘the right of an individual to claim membership of a 
particular community is crucial if that individual is to gain access to a community’s 
collective welfare arrangements’.12 
Social solidarity can represent a manifestation of this collective identity, and 
thus reflect its inherent thresholds of membership and belonging, at several different 
levels. The most important is the state. After all, the bonds of national identity and 
citizenship are inseparable from the diffuse sense of social solidarity which fuelled the 
evolution of the modern European welfare states, and continues to provide the moral 
backbone which supports and justifies their social protection systems.
13
 But other 
levels of solidarity also play an important role: for example, local (such as welfare 
provision organised by the region or commune), functional (as with social protection 
schemes supported by employers and employees), or inter-generational (such as 
pensions systems whereby current workers contribute to the welfare needs of persons 
who have already retired). And also supranational – especially in a complex 
governance system such as the Union, which has the effect of ‘nesting’ individuals 
into several overlapping strata of collective political and cultural consciousness.
14
 
Within such a system, different ideas of ‘community’ can emerge – each carrying its 
own definitions of membership, and its own expectations of social solidarity. In 
                                                 
12
 P Dwyer, Welfare Rights and Responsibilities: Contesting Social Citizenship (The Policy Press, 
2000) p 187. 
13
 Eg A P van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons Within the European Community: Cross-Border 
Access to Public Benefits (Hart Publishing, 2003) Ch 1.  
14
 In particular, T Faist, ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’ (2001) 39 
Journal of Common Market Studies 37. 
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particular, many commentators anticipate the consolidation of a ‘European social 
citizenship’, which will act as a counterweight to the traditional economic constitution 
embodied in the Internal Market, whereby the sense of identity and mutual 
responsibilities which derive from the nationality of a Member State are 
supplemented by a new bond, carrying its own welfare rights and obligations, based 
upon the common heritage accrued through the process of ‘ever closer’ integration.15  
Of course, controversies can arise within any single level of solidarity about 
where best to pitch its own thresholds of belonging and exclusion. For example, at the 
domestic level, a refusal to recognise certain forms of welfare need can effectively 
exclude many individuals from membership of the solidaristic community; and 
indeed, national welfare systems can be organised in a manner which systematically 
discriminates against disadvantaged groups such as women, ethnic minorities and 
homosexuals.
16
 Similarly, at the supranational level, when qualification for the status 
of Union citizen relies exclusively upon the claimant possessing the nationality of a 
Member State in accordance with the latter’s own rules, it can be argued that long 
                                                 
15
 On social citizenship and the role of Union citizenship, eg M Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market 
Citizen’ in J Shaw and G More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 
1995); D O’Keeffe and M Horspool, ‘European Citizenship and the Free Movement of Persons’ (1996) 
XXXI The Irish Jurist 145; S Douglas-Scott, ‘In Search of Union Citizenship’ (1998) 18 Yearbook of 
European Law 29. For contextual discussion of the broader relationship between social citizenship and 
welfare provision in social policy theory, eg N Harris, ‘The Welfare State, Social Security, and Social 
Citizenship Rights’ in N Harris (et al eds), Social Security Law in Context (OUP, 2000).  
16
 Though, of course, Community law can have a positive impact here, eg Dir 79/7 on the progressive 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, 
1979 OJ L6/24; Dir 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L180/22. Cf. Art 3(3) Dir 2000/78 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, 2000 OJ L303/16. 
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term resident third country nationals are unfairly excluded from membership of the 
Union’s own fledgling solidaristic community.17 But more important for present 
purposes is the idea that controversies can also result from the interaction between 
different levels of solidarity, especially as regards relations between the Union and its 
Member States, thanks to the perennial question of competence: how might the 
Community actually go about fulfilling the novel expectations of social solidarity 
which many associate with the promotion of a ‘European social citizenship’?  
 
III. FULFILLING EXPECTATIONS OF SUPRANATIONAL SOCIAL 
SOLIDARITY 
 
One possibility can be discounted immediately: the idea that the Union should act as a 
federal welfare state, enjoying general tax-and-spend redistributive competences. It is 
true that the Union does undertake limited redistributive functions. Consider, for 
example, the common agricultural policy, which organises on a Community-wide 
scale a system of collective responsibility for the social needs of farmers, operating in 
blatant defiance of the economic demands of the market;
18
 or the structural funds, 
whereby significant sums of money are transferred from the more to the less affluent 
countries and regions, in pursuit of greater economic and social cohesion.
19
 Of course, 
                                                 
17
 See recently, eg European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on Access to European Union 
Citizenship, 2003 OJ C208/76. However, note the provisions of Dir 2003/109 concerning the status of 
third country nationals who are long term residents, 2004 OJ L16/44. 
18
 Further, eg E Rieger, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy: Politics Against Markets’ in H Wallace and 
W Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP, 2000). 
19
 Further, eg D Allen, ‘Cohesion and Structural Funds: Transfers and Trade-Offs’ in H Wallace and W 
Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP, 2000). 
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neither system of ‘Community solidarity’ is perfect. The CAP’s traditional focus upon 
price support for agricultural production has tended to benefit big agricultural 
holdings, particularly in northern Europe (though the 2003 reforms decoupling 
income support from agricultural production, and reducing direct income payments 
for larger farms, might help to make the system more equitable).
20
 Meanwhile, the 
structural funds have long been criticised on the grounds that the sums involved are 
not large enough to make any serious contribution to the elimination of persistent 
regional disparities; and have in fact tended to benefit the rich rather than the poor 
even within recipient regions by alleviating the need to increase tax revenues.
21
 But in 
any case, the CAP and structural funds are hardly precedents for any realistic prospect 
of the Union acquiring general competence to provide for the population’s social 
needs based upon classic risks such as unemployment, old age, illness or disability – 
and the reasons are not hard to find. Just as the bond of nationality constitutes an 
essential component of the diffuse sense of solidarity underpinning the Member 
States’ social protection systems, so the lack of any comparable sense of collective 
identity at the supranational level, strong enough to provide popular support for the 
construction of a genuine European welfare system, acts as a serious obstacle against 
the attribution of more far-reaching redistributive functions to the Union.
22
 Put 
                                                 
20
 In particular: Reg 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the 
common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, 2003 OJ L270/1. 
21
 Eg, G Majone, ‘The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation’ (1993) 31 
Journal of Common Market Studies 153. 
22
 Eg, M Rhodes, ‘Defending the Social Contract: The EU Between Global Constraints and Domestic 
Imperatives’ in D Hine and H Kassim (eds), Beyond the Market: the EU and National Social Policy 
(Routledge, 1998). Cf. M P Maduro, ‘Europe’s Social Self: The Sickness Unto Death’ in J Shaw (ed), 
Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
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crudely: it is far from clear that Polish taxpayers would be prepared to pay for the 
unemployment benefits of French citizens living in France; or that Irish taxpayers 
would be happy to fund healthcare for Greek nationals residing in Greece. 
Another possibility fares little better. In certain fields of social policy, such as 
labour law, the Community’s activities are largely regulatory (rather than 
redistributive) in nature – and often involve the harmonisation of national laws, thus 
permitting the Community to promote common standards of social protection across 
the Member States. And indeed, the Treaty has been used to adopt certain 
harmonising measures directing the Member States about how to allocate their own 
welfare resources: consider, for example, Regulation 1408/71 on the cross-border 
coordination of the national social security systems;
23
 Directive 79/7 on equal 
treatment between men and women as regards social security benefits;
24
 and Directive 
2003/8 establishing minimum common principles for legal aid in cross-border 
disputes, intended to facilitate access to justice for less well-off members of society.
25
 
But by-and-large, the scope for approximating national welfare rules is very limited. 
After all, the Treaty expressly precludes the adoption of harmonising measures to 
                                                 
23
 Reg 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families 
moving within the Community (last consolidated version published at 1997 OJ L28/1). See now: Reg 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, 2004 OJ L200/1 (partially repealing and 
replacing Reg1408/71). 
24
 Dir 79/7 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women 
in matters of social security, 1979 OJ L6/24. 
25
 Dir 2003/8 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common 
rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, OJ 2003 L26/41. The Commission’s original proposal was 
even more solidaristic in nature, since it would have covered not only cross-border but also wholly 
internal situations: COM(2002) 13 Final.   
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combat social exclusion or to modernise social protection for citizens other than 
workers; and requires that, in any case, Community action in the social sphere must 
not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles and 
maintain the basic financial equilibrium of their own social security systems.
26
 Those 
limitations on Community competence perhaps reflect more fundamental political and 
logistical obstacles to the harmonisation of national welfare regimes, especially given 
the myriad differences which continue to separate the Member States when it comes 
to the basic character, detailed structure and cultural context of their social protection 
systems.
27
 It is true that the Community has steadily increased the range of its ‘new 
governance’ ventures, aimed at informing and influencing national welfare choices, 
and encouraging Member States to converge around certain core values and 
standards: consider, for example, the open method of coordination in the 
modernisation of social protection, as an integral part of the (post-Lisbon European 
Council) Social Policy Agenda.
28
 Ultimately, however, the lack of extensive 
harmonising competences makes it difficult to identify a truly effective vehicle by 
which the Community might articulate any genuinely supranational framework of 
social solidarity. 
That leaves one final option. It remains open for the Union to fall back upon 
its admittedly less ambitious but still tried-and-tested ‘assimilation model’: 
                                                 
26
 In particular: Arts 137(2) and (4) EC. Also: Art 18(3) EC. 
27
 Eg, M Rhodes, ‘Defending the Social Contract: The EU Between Global Constraints and Domestic 
Imperatives’ in D Hine and H Kassim (eds), Beyond the Market: the EU and National Social Policy 
(Routledge, 1998). 
28
 See, in particular: Commission, A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social Protection, 
COM(1999) 347 Final; Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (23-24 March 2000); 
Commission, Social Policy Agenda, COM(2000) 379 Final. 
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guaranteeing equal treatment between Community and own nationals, so that foreign 
migrants are fully integrated into the solidarity system of their host society, but 
without otherwise questioning the competence of each Member State to determine its 
own welfare choices (or the persistence of differences between the forms and levels of 
social protection available across the Union territory) provided they apply without 
unjustified discrimination on grounds of nationality. The assimilation model is 
therefore based upon the principle of subsidisation – but the relevant subsidies do not 
take the form of direct wealth transfers between social groups organised at the 
Community level. Subsidisation relies instead upon a model of vicarious 
responsibility: novel expectations of social solidarity engendered at the supranational 
level are actually discharged (in the sense of paid for) by the Member States through 
their domestic welfare budgets. For that reason, the assimilation model directly 
challenges – or at least seeks actively to redefine and reshape – traditional national 
thresholds of belonging to and exclusion from the solidaristic community. This 
challenge has been mounted in two main phases. 
The first phase – already well consolidated – concerns the interaction between 
domestic thresholds of belonging / exclusion traditionally based upon nationality; and 
a supranational assimilation model originally focused upon engagement in an 
economic activity – especially through the free movement of workers and freedom of 
establishment. Experience has highlighted an inherent tension between (on the one 
hand) the mobility needs of the Common Market, including the desire to guarantee 
equal access to social benefits as a means of ensuring that such mobility is efficacious 
in practice; and (on the other hand) the collective identity of the solidaristic 
community which grew from within, or at least alongside, the European nation state, 
whereby countries were sometimes willing to appropriate the labour of migrant 
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workers without offering them access to certain welfare benefits in return.
29
 This is 
true less of contributory benefits, or those linked to one’s status as a worker, than of 
non-contributory benefits funded from the public purse that (as we have noted) are 
usually dependent upon a morally demanding sense of diffuse solidarity – for which 
purpose, the collective identity has historically been defined by nationality, and the 
individual’s claim to welfare support thus evidenced by her / his status as a national 
citizen. The Community institutions have consciously set out to deconstruct those 
thresholds for membership, insofar as they adversely affect economically active 
migrants by virtue of their nationality. In particular, that is the basis for the guarantee 
of equal treatment as regards tax and social advantages for foreign workers (whether 
or not they are resident within the relevant Member State) contained in Article 7(2) 
Regulation 1612/68.
30
 In such situations, a direct contribution to the economic life of 
the host community enables the foreign worker to overcome the exclusive nature of 
the group identity, and to benefit from the assimilation model as regards access to 
(even non-contributory, non-employment related) social benefits. 
The second phase – still in its infancy – concerns the interaction between (on 
the one hand) these new domestic thresholds of belonging, whereby a Member State 
offers membership of its solidaristic community to all those, regardless of nationality, 
who make an economic contribution to public resources; and (on the other hand) a 
                                                 
29
 Consider the national attitudes revealed in disputes such as Case 32/75 Fiorini v SNCF [1975] ECR 
1085; Case 63/76 Inzirillo [1976] ECR 2057; Case 65/81 Reina [1982] ECR I-33; Case 261/83 Castelli 
[1984] ECR 3199. 
30
 Reg 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 1968 OJ L257/2. Cp. 
equivalent principles developed as regards self-employed persons under Art 43 EC, eg Case 305/87 
Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1461; Case C-337/97 Meeusen [1999] ECR I-3289; Case C-299/01 
Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-5899.  
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supranational assimilation model which has begun to question whether even that 
requirement can act as a legitimate barrier to the social integration of migrant 
Community nationals. This new interaction has been triggered, in particular, by the 
introduction of Union citizenship under Article 17 EC, together with rights to free 
movement for Union citizens under Article 18 EC, and the concomitant entitlement to 
equal treatment contained in Article 12 EC. These provisions offer a potentially 
fruitful opportunity to those who advocate the further development of the 
Community’s own autonomous contribution to a multi-level welfare system. The 
Union may well lack the deep-rooted popular consciousness required to generate a 
diffuse sense of social solidarity and in turn capable of facilitating the attribution to 
the Community of extensive redistributive competences. And the Union has not been 
entrusted with the legal competence required to harmonise the framework within 
which Member States themselves collect and spend welfare revenue, or organise the 
provision of basic social benefits and services for their populations. But it is 
nevertheless possible that Union citizenship will provide a sufficiently cohesive 
collective identity to justify the assimilation of foreign migrants into the existing 
domestic welfare systems – so that even those who cannot claim membership of the 
national solidaristic community on the basis of their nationality or economic 
contribution would still enjoy the full range of social protection benefits offered by 
each Member State, and indeed so that the latter willingly accepts its role as an agent 
in promoting (and funding) a specifically ‘European social citizenship’.31 
                                                 
31
 On the broader role of equal treatment as a general principle of Community law, including its 
transformation from an economic facilitator to an individual social right, eg K Lenaerts, ‘L’égalité de 
traitement en droit communautaire: un principe unique aux apparences multiples’ (1991) 26 Cahiers de 
Droit Européen 3; G de Búrca, ‘The Role of Equality in European Community Law’ in A Dashwood 
and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997); G More, 
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However, this mismatch between the Community’s potential welfare 
aspirations, and its actual competence to fulfil them, gives rise to tensions which are 
surely even more acute than before, going to the very foundations of the solidarity-
community-membership triptych. In the first place, there is a sense that Community 
law might arbitrarily stretch, to beyond its tolerable limit, the moral argument 
underpinning the acceptance by the national (or local) community of mutual social 
responsibilities through the process of subsidisation.
32
 Indeed, especially when it 
comes to non-contributory benefits and services funded from general (or local) 
taxation, it is not clear that the psychological web of fraternal responsibility which 
justifies and supports public welfare provision will be strong enough to catch not only 
the foreigner who participates in economic life, but also the foreigner who does not so 
contribute.
33
 In the second place, there is also a feeling that any overly ambitious 
attempt by the Union to grant unconditional rights to free movement and residency to 
its own citizens, then simply assimilate them into the domestic systems of social 
protection, could threaten to undermine the delicate financial stability of national 
welfare states, by significantly increasing the potential number of people who might 
                                                                                                                                            
‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in P Craig and G de 
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999). 
32
 Cp. J Steiner, ‘The Right to Welfare: Equality and Equity Under Community Law’ (1985) 10 ELRev 
21; C Tomuschat, ‘Annotation of Sala’ (2000) 37 CM LRev 449. 
33
 Consider the public debate, across many of the old Member States, over free movement rights for the 
citizens of the newly acceding Member States, in the few months before enlargement on 1 May 2004: 
potential contributors as well as potential non-contributors were treated with derision in the popular 
press as ‘spongers’ and ‘welfare tourists’, prompting many governments to introduce or reinforce 
restrictions on residency and equal treatment rights pursuant to (but sometimes only dubiously in 
accordance with) the Accession Treaty 2003.  
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receive solidarity support relative to the actual number of people who contribute to its 
financing – especially given that the burdens of non-economic migration are not 
spread evenly across the Member States.
34
 
 
IV. RESIDENT ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE MIGRANT UNION CITIZENS 
 
Such tensions are most obvious when one considers the situation of economically 
inactive migrant Union citizens residing in another Member State on a stable and 
continuous basis. After all, this raises the prospect of individuals, who cannot claim 
membership of the solidaristic community on the basis of their nationality or 
economic contribution, nevertheless staking potentially long-term claims to possibly 
significant levels of welfare support, simply on the basis of their membership of the 
‘European community’.35 
We now have a sufficient mass of caselaw to be able to map out the Court’s 
general response to this issue. It was established in Sala that Community nationals 
lawfully residing in the territory of another Member State come within the personal 
                                                 
34
 Consider, for example, the migration patterns associated with cross-border education, whereby 
certain countries are clearly net importers or net exporters of students, as discussed by S O’Leary, The 
Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union 
Citizenship (Kluwer Law, 1996) Ch 5; and by C Barnard in this contribution; cf. also A P van der Mei 
also in this contribution.  
35
 Though the Union’s relatively low long-term mobility rates make it possible to argue that rights of 
equal treatment for lawfully resident migrants will not in practice have a destabilising impact upon 
national solidarity systems: see, eg A P van der Mei, ‘Residence and the Evolving Notion of European 
Union Citizenship’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 419. 
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scope of the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship.
36
 This is true of Community 
nationals living within the host territory on the basis of purely domestic immigration 
rules.
37
 But it is also true of Community nationals residing in the Member State on the 
basis of the Treaty.
38
 In this regard, the Court established in Baumbast that Article 18 
EC creates a directly effective right to residency for all Union citizens.
39
 However, the 
Treaty itself expressly refers to the existence of certain limitations and conditions 
upon the exercise of that right to residency as laid down under Community law. Those 
limitations and conditions include the requirement, laid down in secondary 
Community legislation, that Union citizens must possess sufficient resources and 
comprehensive medical insurance.
40
 Nevertheless, the Community courts will 
interpret such provisions restrictively, as with all exceptions and limitations imposed 
upon the fundamental freedoms upheld by the Treaty.
41
 Moreover, the Member States, 
for their part, are obliged to enforce such provisions in accordance with the general 
principles of Community law and (in particular) the principle of proportionality. This 
entitles resident economically inactive migrant Union citizens to expect a degree of 
financial solidarity from their host society, particularly where their welfare needs are 
                                                 
36
 Case C-85/96 M M Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
37
 Case C-85/96 M M Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
38
 Case C-184/99 R Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193. 
39
 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091. 
40
 In particular: Dir 90/364 on the right of residence, 1990 OJ L180/26; Dir 90/365 on the right of 
residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity, 1990 
OJ L180/28; Dir 93/96 on the right of residence for students, 1993 OJ L317/59.   
41
 Eg AG Cosmas in Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207; AG Tizzano in Case C-200/02 
Chen and Zhu (Opinion of 18 May 2004; Judgment pending). 
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temporary and / or limited in character, having regard to their degree of integration 
into the Member State.
42
  
For these purposes, as established in Sala, Article 17(2) EC attaches to the 
status of Union citizen the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the 
right contained in Article 12 EC not to suffer discrimination on grounds of nationality 
within the material scope of the Treaty.
43
 The Court has demonstrated that it will 
adopt an extremely broad approach in this regard: any benefit which falls within the 
material scope of any provision of Community law will be caught by the combined 
effects of Articles 17 and 12 EC, and must be offered on an equal basis to lawfully 
resident migrant Union citizens. There is no need to demonstrate some direct or 
tangible link between one’s enjoyment of the benefit claimed and the exercise of any 
specific right to residence qua Union citizen. For example, in Sala itself, a non-
contributory child-raising allowance which fell within the scope of Community law 
both as a family benefit under Article 4(1)(h) Regulation 1408/71, and as a social 
advantage under Article 7(2) Regulation 1612/68, was automatically treated as falling 
within the material scope of the Treaty for the purposes of Article 12 EC; 
discriminatory qualifying criteria could thus be challenged by the claimant, even if 
she was not an insured person entitled to rely upon Regulation 1408/71, nor a worker 
                                                 
42
 Further: M Dougan and E Spaventa ‘Educating Rudy and the (non-)English Patient: A Double-Bill 
on Residency Rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28 ELRev 699. Also, eg C Jacqueson, ‘Union 
Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? Towards Social Citizenship’ 
(2002) 27 ELRev 260. 
43
 Case C-85/96 M M Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
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entitled to benefit from Regulation 1612/68, simply on the basis that she was a 
lawfully resident migrant Union citizen.
44
  
As regards all benefits falling within the material s cope of Article 12 EC, it is 
possible to challenge both direct discrimination and indirect discrimination on 
grounds of nationality – including domestic rules which make access to social 
advantages conditional upon (for example) a certain period of residence, or prior 
education, within the host territory.
45
 However, as the Court held in Grzelczyk, the 
resident economically inactive migrant Union citizen’s expectation of financial 
solidarity from her / his host society cannot in any case justify the claimant becoming 
an unreasonable burden upon the public finances of the host state.
46
 In that event, the 
national authorities remain competent to terminate the individual’s right to residency 
altogether.
47
 By these means, the Union citizen’s apparently very broad right to non-
discrimination is subject to certain inherent limits: an individual may only claim 
access to welfare benefits within the basic parameters imposed by the unreasonable 
                                                 
44
 Similarly, eg with the minimex as a social advantage under Art 7(2) Reg 1612/68 in Case C-184/99 
R Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; and with 
the tide-over allowance for young people seeking their first employment again as a social advantage 
under Art 7(2) Reg 1612/68 in Case C-224/98 M N D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-
6191. Consider also earlier caselaw such as Case 293/83 Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593; 
though cf. the more restrictive approach in judgments like Case 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161.  
45
 Consider, eg Case C-299/01 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-5899 (given period of 
residence); Case C-224/98 M N D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191 (prior 
education). 
46
 As referred to in the preamble to each of Dir 90/364, Dir 90/365 and Dir 93/96. 
47
 Case C-184/99 R Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193. 
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financial burden test, beyond which the Member State is entitled to repudiate her / his 
lawful immigration status, and with it any further entitlement to equal treatment.
48
  
The Court’s general approach has been adapted to other categories of Union 
citizen who can be considered lawfully resident within the host state, but whose rights 
under Article 18 EC are not limited by reference to the requirements of sufficient 
resources and health insurance, and whose immigration status is therefore not 
dependent upon staying on the right side of the ‘unreasonable burden’ principle. For 
example, Union citizens who arrive in another Member State in search of employment 
have a right to stay under Article 39 EC for a reasonable period of time, and in any 
case for so long as they are still actively seeking work and have genuine chances of 
being engaged.
49
 The Court held in Collins that such Union citizens, being lawfully 
present in another Member State, are entitled to claim equal treatment under Article 
39 EC, read in conjunction with Article 12 EC, as regards non-contributory benefits 
such as jobseeker’s allowance intended to facilitate access to employment in the host 
labour market.
50
 This time, the workseekers’ right to residency – and therefore her / 
his right to equal treatment – is not conditional upon making only Grzelczyk-style 
reasonable demands upon the public purse. The duration of the Union citizen’s 
expectation of equal treatment as regards access to welfare support is limited only by 
the claimant ceasing to make genuine efforts to become engaged and thereby losing 
                                                 
48
 Consider, eg Case C-456/02 Trojani (Opinion of 19 February 2004; Judgment pending).    
49
 Eg Case C-292/89 ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745; Case C-344/95 Commission v Belgium 
[1997] ECR I-1035.  
50
 Case C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Judgment of 23 March 2004). 
Here, the British habitual residency requirement was indirectly discriminatory, and had to be 
objectively justified, by the need for a ‘real link’ between the claimant and the national employment 
market: see further below.  
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any right to stay lawfully within the host state. There is much to be said for this 
approach, for example, in ensuring that the workseeker’s right to free movement has 
practical rather than just theoretical value, and in encouraging greater labour mobility 
to help fill skills shortages within the Internal Market.
51
 But one must also recognise 
that the Court has pushed back one step further the threshold of belonging / exclusion 
by which Member States regulate access to their public welfare systems – a perfect 
illustration of the assimilation model being used to reshape diverse national 
conceptions of diffuse solidarity, not from within but from above, in pursuit of a new 
Community framework of welfare expectations based upon the common bond of 
Union citizenship.
52
 
 
V. THE SITUATION OF TEMPORARY VISITORS 
 
The Court is clearly getting to grips with the friction between conceptions of 
belonging to / exclusion from the national welfare society, and the prospect of the full 
                                                 
51
 Even if the eventual outcome of the objective justification process as undertaken in Collins is that 
workseekers enjoy no right to seek social support during their initial residency – which is arguably 
when some claimants might need it most. Further, eg M Dougan, ‘Free Movement: The Workseeker as 
Citizen’ (2001) 4 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 93. 
52
 Note that Dir 2004/38 on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/77 will extend the ‘limitations and conditions’ 
currently imposed upon exercise of the rights to residence and equal treatment of economically inactive 
migrants: such Union citizens will have no right to equal treatment as regards social assistance during 
their first three months’ residency; indeed, in the case of workseekers, this derogation from the 
principle of non-discrimination will apply for so long as they are still seeking employment (in apparent 
contradiction of the judgment in Collins). However, we will suggest (below) that the picture is not so 
clear as the simple text of Dir 2004/38 would suggest.   
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rigour of the Community’s assimilation model being extended to cover resident but 
economically inactive migrant Union citizens. Yet the proper legal situation is not 
nearly so well explored when it comes to temporary visitors, that is, economically 
inactive migrants who do not ordinarily live, and have no desire to establish their 
usual residence, within the host state.
53
 As a matter of policy, we accept that 
Community law should surely place limits to the integration of temporary visitors into 
national (or local) solidarity systems – recognising that the ambitions harboured in 
certain quarters towards creating a supranational model of social citizenship must be 
reconciled with the limited political and financial ability of the EU (as presently 
configured) to do so; and therefore that the Treaty must avoid the risk of undermining 
either the social cohesion or the financial equilibrium of those national (and local) 
solidarity systems with which it must necessarily interact. The question is how to 
devise a legal framework capable of accommodating this policy.  
In this regard, it is useful to begin by recalling that the equal treatment rights 
of temporary visitors have traditionally been constrained by the legal capacity in 
which such Community nationals exercise their entitlement to free movement. Most 
of the relevant caselaw concerns economic service recipients, and especially cross-
border tourists, falling within the personal scope of Article 49 EC.
54
 It is clear that, as 
well as governing the conditions for enjoyment of the economic services whose 
                                                 
53
 One should acknowledge, but for present purposes need not explore, the factual and definitional 
problems which can arise in distinguishing lawful residency from a mere lawful presence in the 
national territory. Consider, in the EC law context, eg Case 76/76 Di Paolo v Office National de l’ 
Emploi [1977] ECR 315; Case C-102/91 Knoch v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1992] ECR I-4341. 
Similarly, in an English legal context, eg P Smart, ‘Ordinarily Resident: Temporary Presence and 
Prolonged Absence’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 175. 
54
 Eg, Case 286/82 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377. 
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receipt justifies the claimant’s right to free movement within the host territory in the 
first place, Community law also makes provision for the enjoyment of certain 
incidental social advantages funded by the Member State. For these purposes, 
however, the Court has articulated a relatively limited conception of the range of 
benefits actually caught by the Treaty – certainly much more limited than the 
definition adopted as regards Article 7(2) Regulation 1612/68 – and therefore of the 
potential field of application of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.
55
 Certainly, the material scope of Article 49 EC is understood to embrace 
benefits directly linked to enjoyment of the economic services which the claimant has 
entered the territory to receive: for example, the tariffs for entry into publicly-run 
museums and galleries at issue in Commission v Spain and Commission v Italy, which 
tangibly affect upon the position of cross-border tourists in their capacity as such.
56
 
Beyond that, the Court has gone no further than finding service recipients entitled to 
equal treatment as regards access to criminal injuries compensation;
57
 and the 
language in which penal proceedings are conducted.
58
  
As regards such social advantages, the temporary visitor is entitled to 
challenge, on the basis of Article 49 EC, domestic restrictions which directly or 
                                                 
55
 Note that the Court has hinted at a more generous approach to the range of social advantages 
potentially covered by Art 49 EC when it comes to service providers, eg access to social housing as 
addressed in Case 63/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 29 (though the Court also noted that, in most 
cases, service providers will not satisfy the conditions, even of a non-discriminatory nature, bound up 
with the objectives of national legislation on social housing). 
56
 Case C-45/93 Commission v Spain [1994] ECR I-911 (state-run museums); Case C-388/01 
Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-721 (locally-run museums).  
57
 Case 186/87 Cowan v le Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195. 
58
 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-1121. 
 316 
indirectly discriminate on grounds of nationality – including (in particular) residence 
requirements which inevitably favour own nationals over foreign citizens, especially 
when the latter travel as temporary visitors.
59
 However, few commentators seem to 
believe that Article 49 EC confers any right upon migrant service recipients to claim 
equal treatment as regards welfare benefits per se within the host territory. In the first 
place, surely such benefits are not among the range of incidental social advantages 
falling within the material scope of Article 49 EC: their enjoyment can hardly been 
seen as directly linked to the effective exercise of free movement rights by economic 
service recipients such as tourists.
60
 In the second place, the availability of publicly 
funded services cannot constitute provision of the primary economic service whose 
receipt is constitutive of the claimant’s entire right to free movement within the 
relevant Member State. It is true that the Court in judgments such as Peerbooms and 
Müller-Fauré has adopted a relatively fluid interpretation of the relationship between 
the provision of publicly funded benefits in one’s home state, and obstacles to the 
receipt of private economic services within another country, for the purposes of 
liberalising the cross-border availability of healthcare.
61
 However, this caselaw does 
                                                 
59
 As in Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-1121. 
60
 In particular: P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 3
rd
 ed, 2003) pp 
812-814. Cp. F Weiss and F Wooldridge, Free Movement of Persons Within the European Community 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) p 124. For an indication that there are indeed limits to the Court’s 
functional approach to equal treatment as regards social advantages, for the purposes of enhancing the 
exercise of economic rights to free movement, consider Case C-291/96 Grado and Bashir [1997] ECR 
I-5531. 
61
 Case C-157/99 B S M Garaets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ 
Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 Müller Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappi 
ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; for a critique of the Court’s reasoning cf. E Spaventa 
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not call into question the established principle that social advantages subsidised 
entirely from the public purse by the host state cannot in themselves constitute the 
provision of an economic service for the purposes of Community law.
62
 For these two 
reasons, it is thought safe to assume that host states are entitled (in effect) to 
discriminate directly or indirectly on the basis of nationality as regards access to 
welfare benefits, particularly through the imposition of residency requirements, 
without exposing themselves to the possibility of legal challenge by adversely 
affected temporary visitors relying upon Article 49 EC.
63
 
But the situation of temporary visitors must be reassessed according to the 
new legal capacity in which such Community nationals now exercise their right to 
free movement. In particular, how does Union citizenship affect the right to equal 
treatment enjoyed by temporary visitors within their host society? It is possible to 
identify two main approaches: the first accepts that temporary visitors should enjoy 
extensive rights to equal treatment within the host society, so that discriminatory 
restrictions on their access to welfare benefits must always be objectively justified in 
accordance with a valid public interest requirement and the principle of 
proportionality; whereas the second argues in favour of a closer analysis of whether 
temporary visitors should actually be considered in a comparable situation to own 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Public Services and European Law: Looking for Boundaries’ (2002-2003) 5 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 271. 
62
 In particular: Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365; Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447. 
63
 Though several authors pointed out that the scope of equal treatment as regards social advantages 
under Art 49 EC was, to be fair, unstable and open to more expansive future interpretation (especially 
given the tenuous link between the receipt of tourist services and access to criminal injuries 
compensation in Cowan), eg S Weatherill and P Beaumont, EU Law (Penguin Books, 1999) pp 704-
706. 
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nationals and other lawful residents, before Member States are placed under any 
obligation to justify apparently discriminatory restrictions on access to their social 
solidarity benefits. We will now assess each of these approaches in turn.  
 
VI. TEMPORARY VISITORS: THE OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION 
APPROACH 
 
A.  Equal Treatment for Temporary Visitors  
 
On the basis of the Court’s caselaw since 1998, there is significant support for the 
view that temporary visitors have become entitled to move across the Member States 
qua Union citizens, exercising directly effective rights under Article 18 EC; and as 
such, are able to rely upon the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 12 
EC as regards all matters falling within the material scope of Community law.
64
 The 
argument runs as follows. 
If Community nationals lawfully residing in the territory of another Member 
State (including those lawfully resident by virtue of the Treaty) come within the 
personal scope of the provisions on Union citizenship under Article 17 EC, so too 
should Community nationals lawfully visiting the territory of another Member State. 
After all, they too count among the beneficiaries of Article 18 EC, which refers to a 
right not only to reside, but also simply to move across the entire Community 
                                                 
64
 For endorsement (and further detailed analysis) of this objective justification approach to equal 
treatment as regards welfare benefits and services for temporary visitors qua Union citizens, consider A 
P van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community: Cross-Border Access to 
Public Benefits (Hart Publishing, 2003) Ch 6, esp pp 461-480.  
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territory. That proposition is supported by the judgment in Bickel and Franz: besides 
observing that Article 49 EC covers all Community nationals who visit another 
Member State where they intend or are likely to receive services, and are thus free to 
visit and move around within the host territory, the Court also noted that Article 18 
EC confers upon every Union citizen the right to move freely across the 
Community.
65
 That point was reinforced by judgments such as Grzelczyk and 
D’Hoop: referring back to Bickel and Franz, the Court held that the situations falling 
within the personal scope of Community law include exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and, in particular, the freedom to move within the 
territory of the Member States under Article 18 EC.
66
  
It is true that the Court often adopts a default approach to the application of 
Article 18 EC, refusing to address the legal impact of Union citizenship insofar as 
disputes can adequately be resolved through reliance upon traditional free movement 
provisions such as Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC.
67
 However, this is unlikely to mean that 
temporary visitors, since they remain entitled to free movement under the specific 
provisions of Article 49 EC, will in practice be unable to rely upon the Union 
                                                 
65
 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-1121, para 15. 
66
 Case C-184/99 R Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193, para 33; Case C-224/98 M N D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, para 29. 
Also, eg Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-0000, para 24; Case C-224/02 Pusa (Judgment of 
29 April 2004), para 17. 
67
 Eg, Case C-100/01 Ministre de l’Intérieur v A O Olazabal [2002] ECR I-10981 on Art 39 EC; Case 
C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] ECR I-929 on Art 43 EC; Case C-92/01 Stylianakis [2003] ECR I-1291 on 
Art 49 EC.  
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citizenship provisions.
68
 In particular, the Court seems happy to consider the legal 
effects of Article 18 EC in situations where this provision is capable of enhancing 
appreciably the scope or quality of the rights enjoyed by Union citizens, as compared 
to those derived from other legal bases upon which the claimant might theoretically 
also rely. For example, the Court held in Grzelczyk that there is nothing in the Treaty 
text to suggest that students who are Union citizens, when they move to another 
Member State to study there, lose the rights which the Treaty confers upon Union 
citizens – including the right to equal treatment as regards welfare benefits falling 
within the material scope of Community law.
69
 This was true, regardless of the fact 
that such students could have been said already to enjoy a legal basis for their right to 
residency under Article 12 EC and Directive 93/96.
70
 Similarly, the Court held in 
Collins that the workseeker’s inability to challenge discrimination as regards financial 
benefits under Article 39 EC and Regulation 1612/68, as established in judgments 
such as Lebon,
71
 had to be updated in the light of the introduction of Union citizenship 
and developments in the scope of the principle of equal treatment under Article 12 EC 
– permitting migrant workseekers to claim access to financial benefits such as 
                                                 
68
 Not least because judicial practice has never been entirely consistent on this matter: the Court does 
sometimes mention Art 18 EC as an independent source of legal rights, even when traditional free 
movement provisions alone could have resolved the relevant dispute, eg Case C-274/96 Bickel and 
Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; Case C-135/99 Elsen [2000] ECR I-10409. 
69
 Case C-184/99 R Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193. 
70
 Case C-357/89 Raulin [1992] ECR I-1027 on Art 12 EC; Dir 93/96 on the right of residence for 
students, 1993 OJ L317/59. 
71
 Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] ECR 2811. 
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jobseeker’s allowance.72 This was true, regardless of the fact that such workseekers 
could have been said to enjoy a legal basis for their right to residency under Article 39 
EC, as construed in judgments such as ex parte Antonissen.
73
 By analogy, temporary 
visitors should also be entitled to rely on the Treaty to enjoy the rights which 
Community law confers upon Union citizens – regardless of (and in addition to) any 
other rights they might enjoy under provisions such as Article 49 EC.  
With the fact that temporary visitors now fall within the personal scope of 
Article 17 EC, continues the argument, should come all the rights and duties laid 
down by the Treaty which, according to the judgment in Sala, are inseparably linked 
to the status of Union citizen – including the right to equal treatment under Article 12 
EC across the material field of application of Community law.
74
 For these purposes, 
why should the Court follow anything other than the same broad conception of 
‘material scope’ it adopts as regards lawfully resident migrants? In particular, why 
should there be the need to demonstrate any particular link between one’s right to 
enjoyment of the benefit claimed and the effective exercise of one’s right to free 
movement qua Union citizen? It is therefore possible that temporary visitors are now 
entitled to equal treatment, under Article 12 EC, as regards access to whatever welfare 
benefits fall within the material scope of any provision of Community law – including 
the vast range of social advantages generally covered by Article 7(2) Regulation 
1612/68.
75
  
                                                 
72
 Case C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Judgment of 23 March 2004). 
73
 Case C-292/89 ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745. 
74
 Cp. Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, para 16. 
75
 Cp. S Fries and J Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of Justice’ 
(1998) 4 European Public Law 533, who observe that ‘after the ECJ’s judgment in Martínez Sala, it 
would appear that something close to a universal non-discrimination right including access to all 
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This line of argument can be clearly discerned in the Commission’s 2003 
revised proposal for a directive on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
76
 This 
proposal recognised two categories of temporary visitor: first, draft Article 6 offered a 
blanket right of up to six months’ residency for all Union citizens, without the host 
state being able to impose any conditions whatsoever; and secondly, draft Article 7 
envisaged a right of residency for more than six months for those Union citizens who 
are service recipients in the sense of Article 49 EC. For both these categories of 
temporary visitor, draft Article 21 guaranteed equal treatment by the host state with its 
own nationals ‘in areas covered by the Treaty’. The Commission had originally 
proposed that Union citizens exercising their free movement rights, but who were not 
engaged in some gainful activity in either an employed or a self-employed capacity, 
and had not yet acquired the right of permanent residency in accordance with the draft 
directive, should not be entitled to equal treatment as regards entitlement to social 
assistance.
77
 However, that limitation was erased from the revised proposal on the 
grounds that, in the light of the judgment in Grzelczyk, it would be retrogressive in 
relation to the evolving acquis communautaire to exclude those economically inactive 
Union citizens without a right of permanent residence from access to welfare 
assistance.
78
 But for these purposes, the draft directive drew no distinction between 
economically inactive Union citizens ordinarily resident within the host state (for 
example) as students or retired persons; and those who are better seen merely as 
                                                                                                                                            
manner of welfare benefits has now taken root in Community law as a consequence of the creation of 
the figure of the Union citizen’ (at p 536). 
76
 COM(2003) 199 Final.  
77
 COM(2001) 257 Final, draft Art 21(2).  
78
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temporary visitors either relying upon the blanket right to six months’ residency, or 
qualifying to stay for longer as service recipients. In the Commission’s view, every 
migrant Union citizen should be entitled to equal treatment within the host territory 
across the material scope of Community law, even as regards welfare benefits.
79
  
Following that line of analysis, it would seem difficult to identify many limits 
to the scope of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by temporary visitors. In 
particular, such Union citizens would be offered the opportunity to challenge 
restrictions which they could not otherwise have queried in another legal capacity 
under the traditional free movement provisions: social advantages not available to the 
temporary visitor qua service recipient under Article 49 EC could now be opened up 
to claimants qua Union citizen under Articles 18 and 12 EC. The onus would 
therefore fall on Member States to attempt to justify any restriction which directly or 
indirectly discriminates on grounds of nationality – including residency requirements 
of the sort which commonly regulate access to solidarity benefits at the national or 
local level.
80
 
 
B. Objective Justifications for Discrimination  
 
In particular, indirect discrimination must be justified in accordance with an 
imperative requirement and the principle of proportionality. For these purposes, the 
Court in D’Hoop recognised that it was legitimate, in the case of a special 
                                                 
79
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unemployment benefit for young people seeking their first job, for Member States to 
insist on the existence of a ‘real link’ between the claimant and the geographic 
employment market.
81
 Such a real link could (in principle) be made dependent upon 
the claimant having completed her / his education within the national territory – even 
though such a requirement is clearly indirectly discriminatory against migrant Union 
citizens.
82
 The same approach was adopted in Collins. Here, the Court accepted that a 
habitual residency requirement is (in principle) appropriate for the purpose of 
ensuring that some connection exists between those who claim a non-contributory 
jobseeker’s allowance and the competent state’s employment market.83 Although both 
judgments concerned benefits directly related to the individual’s future participation 
in the economic life of the host society, it seems likely that a similar approach will 
extend to other types of welfare benefits intended to cover more universal social risks, 
such as disability allowances or healthcare provision.
84
 By these means, Member 
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 325 
States will have a principled doctrinal defence for their insistence that claimants 
demonstrate some genuine nexus with the national territory before being able to 
access a whole range of social provisions. More fundamentally, the Court’s idea of a 
‘real link’ between claimant and host society can be understood as referring to our 
first, moral, argument – respecting the diffuse psychological sense of fraternity and 
concomitant assumption of mutual welfare responsibilities – that underpins the 
solidarity-community-membership triptych.  
Furthermore, although it is settled Community law that purely economic goals 
can never constitute a valid imperative requirement,
85
 Member States may 
legitimately take account of certain financial considerations when attempting to 
justify indirectly discriminatory barriers to free movement on broader public interest 
grounds. In particular, the Court in judgments like Kohll and Peerbooms was prepared 
to accept that the possible risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the 
social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest 
capable of justifying a barrier to the exercise of fundamental Treaty freedoms; and 
also recognised that maintaining an adequate standard of welfare provision for the 
benefit of the entire population (in casu, in the field of public health, though the same 
approach could, in principle, apply to other forms of social protection) is inextricably 
linked to the Member State’s ability to exercise effective control over its levels of 
financial expenditure.
86
 This in turn implies that the competent public authorities must 
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be in a position to curtail the range of individuals (and especially foreign migrants) 
capable of staking claims against its social solidarity system.
87
 The need to preserve 
the budgetary balance of the welfare state not only provides the Member States with 
another principled legal defence to indirectly discriminatory qualifying criteria, but 
again corresponds, more fundamentally, to our second, financial, argument – 
maintaining a realistic equilibrium between welfare supply and demand – that weds 
together the concepts of solidarity, community and membership.  
 
C.  Problems With the Objective Justification Approach 
 
And so, even employing an objective justification approach, it seems unlikely that the 
Court would in practice allow temporary visitors to free ride on the welfare systems of 
other Member States. Nevertheless, one should still query whether this objective 
justification approach is entirely satisfactory. We would argue that there are 
considerable practical and conceptual problems in requiring automatic judicial 
scrutiny over rules which make non-contributory social benefits conditional upon 
requirements such as residency within the national territory. 
First, the imperative requirements doctrine requires the national courts to 
undertake an assessment of the proportionality of the disputed domestic rules. This 
assessment might be workable enough when the Treaty permits us clearly to identify 
the conflicting interests which must be balanced one against the other: for example, 
eliminating protectionist and discriminatory trade practices, versus respecting national 
regulatory traditions. But history tells us that, even within the framework of economic 
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integration, this proportionality assessment is difficult and inevitably more subjective 
when the yardstick against which the exercise of national regulatory competence must 
be evaluated becomes more blurred: recall the problems encountered by the English 
courts when assessing the proportionality of the Sunday trading rules, expected to 
balance the relative merits of protecting cultural traditions and the freedom to exercise 
an economic activity.
88
 How much more difficult will the proportionality assessment 
become when the scales are weighed between promoting some form of non-economic 
European integration and protecting the national welfare systems? Indeed, in the field 
of equal treatment for Union citizens – particularly when it comes to an imperative 
requirement as abstract as the ‘real link’, which demands an exploration of its own 
moral relevance to the cultural fabric of the welfare society as the finale to any 
proportionality assessment – the national courts will be expected to navigate their way 
through a framework of values which is much less tangible than anything we have 
encountered under Articles 28, 39, 43 or 49 EC. More likely, the notion of the ‘real 
link’ will end up serving its time as an intellectually impoverished substitute for the 
sort of rigorous analysis of the meaning of social solidarity within Europe’s multi-
level welfare society now called for by combined effect of Articles 18 and 12 EC. 
Worse still, the principle that Member States may insist upon a ‘real link’ between 
certain benefits and certain claimants might simply become a smokescreen for highly 
subjective judgments, made by the courts, about which Union citizens do or do not 
deserve public support.
89
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Secondly, the proportionality assessment – particularly when applied to the 
imperative requirement of preserving the financial integrity of the welfare system – 
might well pose important practical problems. If disputes over access to social 
benefits by temporary visitors were to be assessed having sole regard to the particular 
claim before the court, then a residency requirement would never be justified – since a 
single individual would not be capable of endangering the balance of a national 
welfare system. To avoid this result, analysis should focus on the potential cumulative 
effect of multiple claims – as the Court itself recognised in Müller-Fauré in respect of 
the cross-border provision of healthcare services.
90
 Yet it is hardly thinkable that 
national courts would have the resources to engage in a detailed statistical and 
budgetary analysis of the consequences of such possible demands for welfare benefits 
by temporary visitors. It is much more likely that the proportionality of residency 
requirements would be carried out having regard to purely speculative factors. Again, 
the approach in Müller-Fauré is enlightening: the Court felt able to state, on the basis 
of an intuitive assessment, without the apparent support of any empirical research – 
and within the context of non-contentious proceedings under an Article 234 EC 
reference – that the removal of any prior authorisation requirement for non-hospital 
treatment abroad would not jeopardise the financial balance of the national healthcare 
system.
91
  
Both these problems are made worse by the risk of inconsistency in the 
uniform application of Community law by the national courts. Given the difficulties 
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involved in assessing the proportionality of residency requirements as regards welfare 
benefits, the end result reached by domestic judges is very likely to vary – especially 
across different Member States – according to the manner in which the welfare 
system is organised, and the way in which social provision itself is culturally 
perceived.  
One final difficulty concerns not so much the proportionality assessment as 
the underlying conceptual framework of the objective justification approach. This 
framework necessarily implies that, in principle, and subject only to justified 
exceptions, national welfare provisions should be available to all Union citizens in all 
Member States, regardless of nationality or contribution, and merely by virtue of 
Articles 18 and 12 EC. If this is true, it is no longer the case that Community law is 
gradually reshaping national thresholds of belonging to or being excluded from the 
welfare society. Something altogether more dramatic is occurring: Union citizenship 
is being elevated above, and superimposed upon, the notion of national solidarity. 
Indeed, the very fact that a Member State must always justify restrictions on access to 
social benefits by visitors suggests that the Union citizen as such has been catapulted 
in the host welfare society. This bold extension of the assimilation model may well 
bring Union citizenship a big step closer to fulfilling its destiny as the ‘fundamental 
status of the nationals of the Member States’.92 But it is far from evident that such a 
development tallies with current reality within Europe’s multi-level welfare system, 
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where the Member States still legitimately claim primary sovereignty over welfare 
provision. 
Yet if the objective justification approach does not emerge as an entirely 
satisfactory conceptual tool to deal with the problem of equal treatment for temporary 
visitors, where is the solution to be found? In our opinion, a more careful assessment 
of whether discrimination exists at all might provide us with a more rigorous 
framework for analysis.  
 
VII. TEMPORARY VISITORS: THE COMPARABILITY APPROACH 
 
A.  Assessing the Very Existence of Discrimination 
 
Discrimination arises when two comparable situations are treated differently, or two 
non-comparable situations are treated similarly.
93
 If the situations are not comparable, 
any disparity in treatment does not give rise to discrimination (and does not need to be 
justified).
94
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In economic free movement cases, comparability is usually taken for granted: 
the situation of the national worker or self-employed person and the foreign worker or 
self-employed person is deemed to be comparable, and therefore not specifically 
assessed by the Court. Nonetheless, even as regards economic migrants, there are 
disputes in which the Court has had recourse to a prior analysis of comparability in 
order to exclude the existence of discrimination, and thereby avoid any assessment of 
whether the disputed national rules pursued a legitimate aim in a proportionate 
manner. For example, the claimant in Kaba argued that British rules prescribing 
different time-scales for a spouse to gain indefinite leave to remain, depending upon 
whether the main right-holder was a person ‘present and settled’ in the United 
Kingdom or a Community worker, were discriminatory. However, the Court found 
that the situation of a Community worker is not comparable to that of a person 
present and settled in the United Kingdom, since the former’s right to residence 
within the national territory is not unconditional. Consequently, Member States are 
entitled to take into account this objective difference when laying down their 
immigration rules – without having to undergo judicial scrutiny in accordance with 
the objective justification model.
95
 Conversely, Ferlini concerned the application of 
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Article 12 EC to the fees demanded by a group of private hospitals from a 
Community official who was not insured under the national social security system 
(such fees being higher than those charged to insured persons). In order to assess 
whether Article 12 EC applied at all, the Court first assessed the comparability of the 
claimant’s situation with that of an insured person. Only after being satisfied that such 
comparability existed did the Court proceed to analyse the hospitals’ purported 
justification for the discriminatory difference in treatment.
96
 
In the citizenship free movement cases too, there are judgments where the 
issue of comparability between own nationals and migrant Community nationals has 
played a more explicit role in the Court’s reasoning. For example, the Court in Sala 
observed that, since the claimant had been authorised to reside in Germany in 
accordance with domestic immigration legislation, she was to be considered in the 
same position as a German national residing in the national territory. On that basis, 
the claimant was entitled to reply on Article 12 EC as regards a non-contributory 
child-raising benefit, in principle reserved to those permanently or ordinarily resident 
in the Member State, so as to challenge certain directly discriminatory qualifying 
criteria.
97
 Similarly, the Court in Grzelczyk began its substantive analysis of the case 
by observing that a student of Belgian nationality who found him/herself in exactly 
the same circumstances as the claimant would have satisfied the conditions for 
obtaining the disputed minimum subsistence benefit. The fact that the claimant was 
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not of Belgian nationality constituted the only bar to his application for welfare 
support, and it was therefore clear to the Court that the case was one of discrimination 
based solely on the ground of nationality.
98
 Conversely, the Court in Garcia Avello 
had recourse to the notion of comparability, this time to establish that identical 
treatment by the Member State of two situations which could not in fact be considered 
comparable amounted to discrimination which then needed to be justified.
99
 And more 
generally, the Court throughout its citizenship caselaw seems (consciously) to have 
left open the door to a more extensive future role for the comparability question: 
‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are 
expressly provided for’.100 Clearly, comparability is often assumed – but it is not 
ignored altogether.  
 
B. Comparability and Temporary Visitors 
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This framework – based upon a prior assessment of comparability, though 
incorporating a set of refutable presumptions – could be usefully adopted in relation 
to claims over social advantages by migrant Union citizens.  
To begin with, Union citizens who are lawfully resident in another Member 
State should, as a matter of principle, be considered in a comparable situation to own 
nationals, and therefore entitled to equal treatment (subject to justifications) in respect 
of all benefits.
101
 Moreover, other Union citizens who are not resident but 
nevertheless have a ‘real link’ to the host territory may also be treated as being in a 
comparable situation to own nationals and lawful residents. This is the case 
particularly for frontier workers, who enjoy equal treatment as regards all social 
advantages falling within Article 7(2) Regulation 1612/68, and are therefore entitled 
to challenge discriminatory requirements imposed by the host state – demonstrating 
that membership of the solidaristic community may be established by means other 
than residency.
102
 It might even be the case that, in relation to certain other non-
residents, the introduction of Union citizenship shifts the focus away from a purely 
market-oriented notion of belonging, whereby entitlement to benefits is a direct result 
of the economic output produced by the frontier worker, towards a broader notion of 
inclusion, whereby entitlement to benefits is recognised also for those whose claim to 
membership of the solidaristic community can be established through non-economic 
links: for instance, by performing unpaid activity in the context of charitable work. 
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However, as regards other non-residents – temporary visitors stricto sensu – 
the situation is more complex, and comparability needs to be established before a 
finding of discrimination can be made. For these purposes, an assessment of whether 
the two situations are comparable will necessarily depend upon the type of benefit 
claimed. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish benefits paid by the public purse into 
three categories: those which arise from the discharge of public order duties 
pertaining to the state’s sovereignty; those which arise out of the state’s choice to use 
public funding to foster non-solidaristic policy objectives; and those which indeed 
reflect a link of solidarity between community and individual. 
Benefits arising from the discharge of public order duties would include, for 
instance, defence, police, and the administration of justice, that is, areas which are 
usually considered the key element of sovereignty and where the state claims an 
absolute monopoly. Here, the state owes similar duties towards all those who are 
subject to its jurisdiction and / or present within its territory, and therefore 
comparability between residents and non-residents should be easily established.
103
 
Take the social advantage at issue in Cowan: the French compensation scheme for 
victims of crime resulted from the state’s acknowledgment of failures in its policing 
duties – borne towards residents and non-residents alike – so that such a benefit could 
not be made conditional upon residency, even though it is entirely funded from the 
public purse.
104
 Or consider the social advantage at issue in Bickel and Franz: the 
language used in criminal proceedings directly related to the rules of procedure in the 
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administration of justice – a public law duty borne by the Italian state towards 
residents and non-residents alike – which could not be made dependent upon 
residency within the local territory.
105
 This is not to say that such indirect 
discrimination can never be justified, only to observe that it must be justified, by 
reference to an imperative requirement plus the principle of proportionality. 
The second category of benefits are those which, again funded from the public 
purse, neither represent a discharge by the state of its fundamental public order duties 
nor reflect a link of solidarity between the community and the individual. The state 
may be seeking to fulfil certain social policy objectives (such as the preservation and 
dissemination of the collective heritage), but it is not assuming responsibility for the 
basic physical and economic well-being of the members of its community. In such 
cases, comparability should also readily be established. Take, for example, 
Commission v Spain and Commission v Italy, where the Court extended the principle 
of non-discrimination to cover the conditions for entry into museums, accepting (as 
we have seen) that there was a close link to the reception of economic services as a 
tourist, thus triggering the joint application of Articles 49 and 12 EC.
106
 Following the 
direct effect of Article 18 EC, a different and more consistent framework of analysis 
should be adopted. The tourist qua Union citizen clearly falls within the personal 
scope of the Treaty, and museum entry conditions clearly fall within the material 
scope of the Treaty. Thus, so long as the situations are comparable, the principle of 
equal treatment applies and any residency requirement needs to be justified. Given 
that entry into museums is clearly not a manifestation of solidarity premised upon 
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membership of the national community, but an aspect of broader cultural and 
educational policy objectives, there is no reason why a non-resident tourist should be 
considered in any way different from a resident tourist.
107
  
Finally, there are those benefits which indeed stem from a link of social 
solidarity: for example, subsistence benefits like income support, disability 
allowances, and non-emergency healthcare. Such benefits truly reflect the assumption 
of responsibility by the community towards its weaker members, and the situation of 
the resident should in principle be considered non-comparable to that of the non-
resident, who does not belong to the host society. In such cases, therefore, Member 
States should in principle be allowed to ‘distinguish’ on grounds of residency without 
having to rely on the imperative requirements doctrine, or undergoing the 
proportionality assessment. Imagine that a French tourist presents herself at a London 
hospital asking for treatment – free at the point of delivery – in respect of her chronic 
arthritic pains. She is told that such non-emergency healthcare is reserved only to 
residents of the United Kingdom. Can she claim that, as a migrant Union citizen 
exercising rights to free movement under Article 18 EC, she is the victim of indirect 
discrimination contrary to Article 12 EC, which the Member State must now 
objectively justify? We believe not. Since the benefit is an expression of social 
solidarity, the claimant’s situation should not be considered comparable to that of 
members of the relevant community of reference, and the residency requirement 
would be safe from scrutiny. 
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C. Benefits of the Comparability Approach 
 
Evidently, both the objective justification and the comparability approach 
acknowledge that, until the Community acquires and exercises more extensive 
competences in the fields of taxation and social welfare, Union citizenship must be 
based on the principle of co-existence between the different – and potentially 
competing – elements of the Union’s multi-level solidarity system. In particular, both 
models recognise that Member States are entitled to distinguish between own 
nationals and other lawful residents (on the one hand) and temporary visitors (on the 
other hand) in cases which presuppose a minimum threshold of belonging before the 
host community should be asked to assume responsibility for the provision of welfare 
benefits. Therefore, both approaches help to avoid a situation in which Community 
law fundamentally challenges basic societal choices which flow from the link binding 
together members of a solidaristic community; and ensure that the emerging 
framework of free movement rights and equal treatment for Union citizens does not 
endanger the financial viability of valuable public services. The main difference 
between the two models lies in the fact that the objective justification approach treats 
the necessity of a ‘real link’ between claimant and host society as a legitimate defence 
for indirect discrimination; whilst the comparability approach considers that the 
absence of such a link is sufficient to exclude the existence of discrimination 
altogether.  
It is true that, since each model is focused on establishing the existence of a 
‘real link’, the same factors (such as the nature of the benefit under dispute and its 
mode of funding, or the claimant’s past and present relationship with the host society) 
can be relevant in both the objective justification and the comparability approach. 
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Against that background, the very validity of comparability as a conceptual model has 
been questioned in the scholarship. For instance, de Búrca has argued that, whilst the 
comparability approach provides a defence which is substantially equivalent to that 
available under the objective justification approach, the former has the undesirable 
effect of enabling Member States to avoid offering a clear articulation of the policy 
reasons justifying an apparent difference in treatment. Furthermore, the choice 
between a comparability approach and a justificatory approach affects the burden of 
proof: in the former case, it is for the claimant to establish the existence of 
discrimination, and therefore to prove that the two situations are comparable; whereas 
in the latter case, it is for the defendant Member State to prove that the rules pursue a 
legitimate policy objective in a proportionate fashion.
108
  
Those might well be valid criticisms. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in 
mind that de Búrca raises them in the context of trade law. In the case of trade 
restrictions, the aim of liberalisation is clearly sanctioned by the EC Treaty (and the 
WTO agreement). In this context, it is easier to argue that the onus should fall on the 
Member State to justify the proportionality of its regulatory standards, once a barrier 
to movement has been identified. Yet even here, to endorse the objective justification 
approach, without paying due regard to the need to conduct an a priori assessment of 
the very existence of discrimination, reflects preconceptions about the relative 
importance of competing policy objectives which are hardly uncontested.
109
 This 
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problem becomes even more acute in the field of social welfare, where the normative 
vision for the interplay between the national solidarity systems, as well as the nature 
and extent of the Union’s own social policy ambitions, is much more ambiguous. 
Here, the postulate of equal treatment – that the temporary visitor is automatically 
entitled to the same level of solidaristic support as any own national or other lawful 
resident – challenges too hastily basic assumptions about the allocation of mutual 
responsibilities between citizens and societies. By contrast, the comparability 
approach – as well as avoiding the difficulties inherent in applying the principle of 
proportionality – seems better equipped to reconcile the effects of Union citizenship 
with the very notion of a national solidaristic community. In particular, focusing more 
rigorously on the issue of comparability allows us to question the conceptual 
desirability of superimposing onto the Member States, without more ado, a novel set 
of binding welfare values based on the assimilation model – a set of values which 
may not tally with the basic thresholds of belonging which are a defining 
characteristic of any morally and financially self-sustaining solidarity system.  
 
VIII. THE IMPACT OF DIRECTIVE 2004/38 
 
How does all this fit in with the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/38,
110
 the new 
regime on free movement for Union citizens adopted by Council and Parliament in 
spring 2004?  
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I-2099.  Further: E Spaventa, ‘On discrimination and the theory of mandatory requirements’ (2000) 3 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 457. 
110
 Dir 2004/38 on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/77. 
 341 
Article 6 Directive 2004/38 provides that all Union citizens shall enjoy a right 
of residence for up to three months in any of the Member States ‘without any 
conditions’.111 This is the first time that the residency status of Union citizens simply 
qua visitors – and regardless of their economic status – has been codified in secondary 
legislation.
112
 It confirms the view – which, as we have seen, was already evident 
from the Court’s caselaw – that temporary visitors fall within the personal scope of 
Article 18 EC on the basis of their right to move freely across the Community. 
However, whilst Article 6 is phrased in an unconditional fashion, the new regime is 
not in fact as generous as it seems (or as the Commission’s 2003 revised proposal had 
suggested). Two caveats have been imposed. First, Article 14 Directive 2004/38 
makes retention of even the temporary right of residence expressly conditional upon 
its beneficiary not becoming an unreasonable burden upon the host society – thus 
extending the Court’s caselaw beyond long term economically inactive migrants such 
as Grzelczyk, so as also to cover short term economically inactive Union citizens.
113
 
Secondly, under Article 24 of the Directive 2004/38 – which sets out a general 
principle of equal treatment for all lawfully resident Union citizens as regards all 
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benefits falling within the scope of the Treaty – Member States are not obliged to 
confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months’ residence of any 
economically inactive Union citizen.
114
 Directive 2004/38 thus allows for the 
exclusion of any right to equal treatment as regards social assistance for the entire 
duration of the temporary visitor’s sojourn in the host society pursuant to Article 6. 
On that basis, it could be argued that the basic problem analysed in this 
chapter – that of temporary visitors using their newfound status as migrant Union 
citizens to gain access to the solidarity benefits of the host society – has been 
effectively resolved by Directive 2004/38: without having to make any specific choice 
between the objective justification approach or the comparability model, the 
Community legislature has simply decreed that temporary residents (i.e. visitors) can 
be legitimately excluded from the right to equal treatment in relation to social 
assistance within the host state. Even if the reasoning process is very different, at least 
the end-result envisaged by Directive 2004/38 seems in keeping with the underlying 
policy objective – that of preserving the thresholds of belonging and exclusion which 
define the fundamental characters and preserve the financial balance of the national 
solidarity systems – which led us to prefer the comparability model over the objective 
justification approach in our analysis above. All’s well that ends well: should we not 
be satisfied? If only things were that simple. Further reflection in fact reveals two 
potential problems with the scheme embodied in Directive 2004/38.  
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The first concerns the meaning of ‘social assistance’. Directive 2004/38 does 
not offer any precise definition of this term, even though the matter is crucial to the 
effective operation of Article 24. One possibility would be to look for inspiration from 
the parallel expression found in Article 4(4) Regulation 1408/71.
115
 In the latter 
context, the Court has construed the term ‘social assistance’ narrowly, so as to cover 
only means-tested benefits offered by the public authorities on a discretionary 
basis.
116
 If that definition were to be adopted also as regards Directive 2004/38, then 
we could hardly treat the derogation contained in Article 24 as comprehensive in its 
attempt to prevent economically inactive Union citizens, relying upon the right of 
temporary residency under Article 6, from claiming equal treatment as regards 
welfare benefits and other social services. Apart from the relatively narrow category 
of discretionary social assistance, temporary visitors would still be entitled to rely on 
Article 12 EC (and indeed the general principle of equal treatment otherwise referred 
to in Article 24 Directive 2004/38) to seek access to the host state’s welfare system. 
And so it would still be necessary for the Court to decide whether to adopt a 
straightforward objective justification approach (with all the practical and conceptual 
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problems that would raise); or whether to treat such migrant Union citizens as being 
in a non-comparable situation to own nationals and other lawful residents (exempting 
the Member State from any obligation to justify its differential treatment).  
However, it seems more likely that the term ‘social assistance’ as used in 
Article 24 Directive 2004/38 is intended to have its own autonomous meaning, indeed 
covering any non-contributory welfare benefit or service which would amount to an 
encumbrance upon the public purse.
117
 But this merely leads on to our second 
potential problem with the new free movement regime. Secondary legislation must 
conform to and be interpreted in the light of the Treaty (as interpreted by the 
Court).
118
 For these purposes, the judgments in Grzelczyk and Baumbast 
fundamentally altered the legal relationship between the Treaty, the Community 
legislature and the Member States in the field of Union citizenship. All measures 
which regulate the right to free movement – including Directive 2004/38 – act as 
limitations and conditions upon the citizen’s fundamental freedom under Article 18 
EC; and Member States are required to apply those limitations and conditions in 
accordance with the general principles of Community law and, in particular, the 
principle of proportionality. Thus, we are back to square one: whatever the black-
letter terms of Article 24 Directive 2004/38, it will remain open to a temporary 
resident (i.e. visitor) to argue that her / his exclusion from equal treatment as regards 
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social assistance benefits strikes an unfair balance between, on the one hand, effective 
enjoyment of the Union citizen’s right to free movement and, on the other hand, the 
Member State’s legitimate interest in protecting its welfare system against inequitable 
claims. The bottom line is that, for so long as the Court is willing to pursue the logic 
of Grzelczyk and Baumbast, neither the Community legislature nor the Member States 
enjoy the competence to dictate that any category of Union citizen should be 
definitively excluded from enjoying equal treatment as regards any benefit falling 
within the material scope of the Treaty. And therefore any welfare rule is potentially 
subject to the scrutiny in terms of proportionality with all the problems that that might 
entail. 
And so, despite the best efforts of Council and Parliament, Directive 2004/38 
cannot simply have extinguished the problem of how far temporary visitors are 
entitled to claim equal treatment with own nationals and other lawful residents when 
it comes to welfare benefits available within the host territory. As soon as the 
claimant invokes the reasoning in Grzelczyk and Baumbast, it will become necessary 
to look beyond the bare text of Article 24 and ask once again  what is the most 
appropriate doctrinal framework to exclude migrant Union citizens from access to 
social support from a national solidarity system to which they do not belong: an 
objective justification approach or the comparability model? But in this regard, the 
adoption of Directive 2004/38 (while it may not have solved the problem of 
temporary visitors exactly as its authors intended) does add one more argument for 
supporting the comparability model over the objective justification approach.  
If the Court were eventually to adopt an objective justification approach to 
temporary visitors who were attempting to overreach the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 by reference to the reasoning in Grzelczyk and Baumbast, then the national 
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authorities would be required to assess, on a case-by-case basis, why this particular 
individual should be denied equal treatment as regards social assistance in these 
particular circumstances. For these purposes, the claimant’s case might even seem 
bolstered by the fact that the safeguard provision contained in Article 14 Directive 
2004/38 offers Member States the chance to terminate the right to temporary 
residency, should application of the principle of equal treatment transform the 
claimant into an unreasonable financial burden. In such circumstances, one might 
suppose that the possibility of temporary visitors using the principle of proportionality 
to access limited welfare benefits within the host society, even during their three 
months’ sojourn and despite the express terms of Article 24 Directive 2004/38, should 
not be viewed too seriously.  
But perhaps the legitimate national interests embodied in Directive 2004/38 go 
further than this argument would acknowledge. Through the derogation contained in 
Article 24, Council and Parliament have clearly sought to eliminate any risk of 
welfare tourism. Indeed, the problem is not so much a matter of the claimant 
becoming an unreasonable burden, but of any claimant being a ‘burden’ (even if a 
reasonable one). Thus, Directive 2004/38 recognises that any claim (however small) 
draws away from the resources which have been allocated to the needs of a given 
welfare society – by its members, for its members. That is a political statement about 
the value of belonging to a community of interests, as a precondition to enjoying 
access to that community’s solidaristic support, which we should still strive to 
accommodate. If the Court were to adopt the view that, when it comes to welfare 
benefits, temporary visitors are not automatically in a comparable situation with own 
nationals and other settled residents, then even if the migrant Union citizen were to 
invoke the principle of proportionality embodied in Grzelczyk and Baumbast, it would 
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in the end offer the claimant little assistance: the underlying principle of equal 
treatment would still not be activated, and the Member State would not be compelled 
to offer any defence of its differential treatment. By this route, the caselaw on Union 
citizenship need not have the effect of undermining the delicate compromise reached 
by Council and Parliament as regards the mutual allocation of responsibilities 
between the national solidarity systems. Indeed, the comparability model emerges as 
the most effective way of ensuring that the derogation contained in Article 24 
Directive 2004/38 proves effective in practice. 
 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
When Marshall included social rights alongside civil and political rights in his 
threefold classification of the entitlements pertaining to national citizenship,
119
 
perhaps he did not fully foresee how the later twentieth century would witness the 
gradual disaggregation of those traditional components of national citizenship.
120
 
Particularly in the Member States of the European Economic Community-turned-
European Union, the forces of cross-border migration – facilitated at first by the goal 
of closer economic integration, then also by the ambition of greater political union – 
have shown us that it is perfectly possible for foreigners to enjoy extensive 
expectations of welfare protection within their host society, without necessarily 
sharing in the political rights and responsibilities which are often reserved to own 
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nationals.
121
 This process reminds us that the concept of social solidarity is not a 
constant or given, but dynamic and up for renegotiation. In particular, under the 
influence of Union citizenship, and through the medium of the assimilation model, 
social solidarity is undoubtedly becoming less statist and more cosmopolitan in its 
orientation. The question is: just how far can the common identity provided by Union 
citizenship justify the assimilation of economically inactive migrants into the 
traditional welfare societies of the Member States? Because, on another view, the 
primary reference point for social solidarity, linked essentially to national identity, 
remains relatively resilient and prone to self-assertion – especially when the Member 
State’s own definitions of membership appear to be redefined ‘from above’ by 
Brussels and Luxembourg (rather than ‘from within’ by the domestic experience of 
social change and political debate).
122
  
This fundamental tension is bound to saturate any analysis of how the 
introduction of Union citizenship has affected the legal status of temporary visitors. 
Before, under Article 49 EC, such migrants enjoyed only limited rights to equal 
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treatment within the host state under Community law. Now, under Articles 18 and 12 
EC, temporary visitors might appear to enjoy much more extensive rights to equal 
treatment. However, we have argued that Union citizenship should not seek to 
deconstruct altogether the thresholds of belonging and exclusion underpinning the 
domestic/national welfare settlement. Otherwise, one would risk substituting a sense 
of popular acceptance (however tacit) with a sense of widespread alienation for a 
legal construct which is still perceived as far removed from many individuals’ core 
cultural and emotional ties. The prime objective of Union citizenship should be to 
create a new model of inclusion which complements rather than replaces existing 
notions of national citizenship.
123
 And for these purposes, we should not pretend that 
all Union citizens are equal claimants vis-à-vis the national solidaristic community. 
What is the most convincing conceptual architecture by which our legal 
discourse can accommodate this differentiation between Union citizens? The idea of a 
‘real link’ is emerging as the key concept in mediating between rights to equal 
treatment for migrant Union citizens and the Member State’s legitimate interest in 
protecting its social welfare system. But one key issue which remains to be clarified is 
how far that concept should play a role only in the endgame of an objective 
justification approach; or (as we have argued) also in the elaboration of a more 
doctrinally rigorous comparability model. By taking comparability between residents 
and non-residents for granted, the objective justification approach challenges the basic 
assumption that there is something unique about community membership which 
justifies individual sacrifices for the common good. For this reason, it has been 
submitted that, when it comes to welfare benefits and services which are an 
expression of social solidarity by the community towards its members, temporary 
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visitors should not automatically be equated to own nationals, lawful residents and 
others who (by whichever means) manage to establish a persuasive link of belonging 
to the host society. In practical terms, this might look a little like reinventing the 
wheel: the temporary visitor qua Union citizen can claim equal treatment as regards 
access to the same sorts of social advantages (such as museum entry fees, criminal 
injuries compensation, and the conduct of penal proceedings) as she / he could expect 
qua service recipient under Article 49 EC. But reinventing the wheel in this manner 
became necessary when, first, the Member States created the institution of Union 
citizenship; then, secondly, the Court of Justice infused that institution with powerful 
legal potential. And reinventing the wheel in this manner seems entirely appropriate 
if, whilst accepting the rapid pace of change in our multi-level welfare society, we are 
to acknowledge not only the financial but also the moral imperatives which continue 
to lie at the very foundation of European social solidarity.  
